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Contracting for Buyer Control of Generative Artificial Intelligence Platforms in Chinese Higher Education

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Abstract: When a university buys a generative artificial intelligence (AI) platform through an integrator, it must decide which tasks its own staff need to perform if the service changes or the contract ends. This study follows that decision from tender specifications into supplier evaluation in Chinese higher education. Of 31 awards examined, 17 concerned application-led purchases. Linked tender and award records were coded for model substitutability, interface interoperability, asset migration and contractual handover. Five application-led lots specified a route to alternative models, two specified external interface rules and three called for reusable asset export or migration. In Fuzhou, two of six qualified suppliers failed technical conformity at the overall demonstration stage. In a mixed software and hardware tender in Zhejiang, the 5.49-point lead exceeded the combined 4.40-point range of four model-access and interface items. With the bidder set and other scores fixed, deleting those items left a minimum lead of 1.09 points. These cases distinguish an eligibility safeguard from a scored preference and show when published records suffice to check whether selected criteria could have affected an award.

Keywords: Generative artificial intelligence; Organizational contracting; Technology outsourcing; Buyer control; Supplier evaluation; Higher education procurement

1. Introduction

Who can change the model after a university has signed with an integrator? Much depends on who controls the endpoint and credentials. A lecturer may build an application around the university's knowledge base using the platform's workflow tools. At renewal, exporting that workflow may be straightforward. Reconnecting its plugins and restoring access may still require the supplier's help. The tender is where the buyer can name the tasks its own staff will need to perform.

Studies of public-sector artificial intelligence (AI) a explain why organizational capacity, standards and accountability shape adoption (Madan & Ashok, 2023; Straub et al., 2023; Wirtz et al., 2019; Zuiderwijk et al., 2021). Work on procurement links those decisions to sourcing governance, buyer motivation and risk awareness (Culot et al., 2026; Hamscher et al., 2026; Patrucco et al., 2026). In China, public demand has also been examined for its role in supplier development and digital transformation (Chen et al., 2025; Xia & Zhao, 2026; Zhang et al., 2026). We follow one part of the sourcing decision at a finer scale. A requirement to substitute models can appear in a pass-or-fail demonstration, carry its own points or sit within a broader service proposal. Its placement determines how evaluators can use the evidence.

We read the tender as a record of what the buyer intended to delegate and what it asked to retain. A university can leave configuration, connector maintenance and training to an integrator during operation. Its staff may still need authority to change credentials or move a workflow when the relationship changes. The wording identifies what the buyer requested. The evaluation record shows which parts of the request were subject to a test or a score.

We chose Chinese higher education as a setting in which the work of a platform integrator and the continuing responsibilities of the buyer can be examined within the same purchase. A university may contract for deployment and support while its staff still need to use institutional knowledge bases, edit applications and manage access. Public tender and award files made it possible to trace some of those requirements across decision stages. The

study asks which safeguards buyers specified and how those safeguards entered screening and scoring. The 17 application-led lots supply the clause evidence. Fuzhou disclosed how many suppliers passed technical conformity. Zhejiang published the relevant point ranges and all five evaluated totals.

The analysis connects the wording of an outsourcing safeguard to the evidence a supplier must provide. It also addresses a question that can arise after award. Could the points attached to a disputed item have changed the winner? Sometimes the published point ranges and bidder totals settle that question. When they do not, the calculation shows why the office needs more detailed records.

2. Buyer Control in Outsourced Technology Contracts

2.1 What the Buyer Delegates

Buyers of complex services must specify work they will have limited ability to observe or control directly (Brown et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2018; Girth et al., 2012; Williamson, 1981). Brown et al. (2018) describe why delivering those services often requires cooperation from the supplier. In cloud projects the software and the contract can evolve together after work starts, as Huber et al. (2025) show. For a university platform, the change might be a replacement model, a plugin that stops working or a workflow that needs to run somewhere else. A tender can identify the person responsible and say what a bidder must demonstrate for each task.

Public procurement for innovation research identifies specification and procurement capability as ways a buyer shapes demand and supplier responses (Adjei-Bamfo et al., 2023; Adjei-Bamfo et al., 2025; Arai, 2026; Castelnovo et al., 2023; Edler & Georghiou, 2007; Georghiou et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2025). Specification can also influence who enters (Drake & Xu, 2025; Jääskeläinen et al., 2026; Patti, 2026; Tátrai et al., 2024). Hamscher et al. (2026) connect organizational decisions about sourcing AI to how public buyers perceive risk. Here the unit of observation is the individual requirement and its place in supplier selection. That level of detail is useful because a tender may state that the organization needs control over a capability but leave the bidder's proof to a service proposal judged as a whole. Work on measuring contracting effort from procurement texts provides a precedent for treating the specification as evidence about how the buyer manages the contract (Potoski et al., 2026).

2.2 Which Capabilities Can be Retained

When switching costs are high, the practical alternatives available to the buyer depend on compatibility and the ability to take assets to another provider (Jeon et al., 2023; Kim, 2026; Klemperer, 1995; Rubinfeld, 2024; Verstraete et al., 2025). In the public-sector AI literature, access to alternative models is one way to keep a service functioning when a model changes (Langer & Haag, 2026). Work on orchestration and contractual allocation of responsibility likewise treats dependence as a consequence of control over specific tasks (Abdulbari, 2026; Hao, 2026). A menu of models can therefore be a useful first indication. A buyer should also ask who controls that menu, what the application can connect to, and what remains available if the service ends.

We distinguish access to alternative models, connection to external systems, transfer of reusable assets and handover. The first two concern what the platform can run and connect to. Asset migration concerns what can be taken out in a usable form. Handover concerns who must provide access and materials so that work can continue. A buyer can have a reasonable answer in one area and very little assurance in another.

2.3 What Evaluation Records Show

Tender competition is studied at entry, screening and award because each stage acts on a different set of suppliers (Coviello & Mariniello, 2014; Decarolis, 2014; Drake & Xu, 2025; Jääskeläinen et al., 2026; Krieger et al., 2026; Lewis & Bajari, 2011; Lewis-Faupel et al., 2016; Nemec, 2024; Tátrai et al., 2024). A technical conformity decision can eliminate a bid before ranking. Points affect the ordering among bids already under consideration. We examine how evaluators use these rules when they assess the AI system being bought. Research on tools that help buyers process and score bids addresses a different role for AI in procurement (Andersson et al., 2025; Hanninen et al., 2026; McKinley et al., 2026).

The award register records the parties and the amounts the buyer committed. Research on procurement records distinguishes those outcomes from bids and supplier relationships (Cao et al., 2024; Falcone et al., 2024; Fazekas & Kocsis, 2020; Fazekas et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025; Luo & Lin, 2026; Pliatsidis, 2024; Tang et al., 2025; Ye et al., 2026). A high-value contract may combine applications with the equipment that runs them, and separate awarded entities may belong to the same group. The appendix considers both when describing expenditure. The tender and assessment records supply the main evidence about how the institution tests the capabilities on which its operations may later depend.

2.4 Evidence of Who Can Act

A university can test control over model access by asking one of its own administrators to configure an endpoint and run an existing application against it. If the integrator must perform the change under its own credentials, the tender can instead assign an obligation to provide access or cooperate with transfer. The options are distinguishable when the specification names the actor and the action. Mere availability of several models shows considerably less.

For a workflow, much depends on what the university would have to rebuild during a transition. Exporting a set of structured records preserves information. A workflow definition includes the sequence and the dependencies needed to execute it. An import test can also specify a receiving environment. We capture the difference in the coding and check how the results change when a procurement must mention both import and export for migration.

3. Data and Methods

3.1 Source Records and Analytical Scope

The archive combines tender notices, award notices and technical attachments from 2025 and 2026. Site-restricted searches centered on the China Government Procurement Network and also covered provincial portals and university sites. Chinese search terms combined large language models or AI agents with platform, deployment or knowledge base. The supplement reproduces the saved search strings. The archive was last updated on 20 November 2026. We matched tender and award records by project and lot and retained records with a relevant procurement object, an identifiable awarded lot and a positive award value. The archive contains 47 awarded lots, including 31 from universities and vocational colleges. Table 1 lists the units and extracted fields.

Table 1. Source records, fields and analytical units

Record	Main Extracted Fields	Analytical Unit	Use in Analysis
Tender notice	Buyer, project and lot, procurement object, date, procedure	Lot and tender round	Determine scope and link records
Technical requirements and scoring rules	Capability, deliverable, required evidence, assessment stage, points	Requirement and rubric item	Code portability and trace its assessment
Award notice and itemization	Awarded legal entity, amount, components, prices where disclosed	Awarded lot	Measure expenditure and identify bundles
Conformity or scoring report	Qualified, excluded and scored suppliers, reasons, points	Supplier, lot and stage	Analyze eligibility and award-margin sensitivity
Ownership source	Legal entities, documented group relationships	Supplier entity	Aggregate related winners

Seventeen lots named a generative AI application or application platform as a procurement objective. Those lots form the clause sample. Zhejiang purchased model deployment and hardware, which puts it outside that group. Its rubric and published scores make it possible to check the winning margin. Appendix A covers award values for the broader portfolio and shows how the total changes when documented compute bundles are excluded.

Project, lot and round identifiers were retained separately. Fuzhou's three invitations establish the case chronology. Different rounds of the same lot were matched to the appropriate evaluation record. In Hunan, similar teaching-system projects associated with separate procurement plans were kept distinct. Where several lots shared a notice, technical and evaluation information was attributed to the identifiable lot.

Technical records were linked to outcomes on the published project and lot identifiers. For the two main cases, the file review checked that the technical requirements and reported evaluation concerned the same invitation. In an award covering several products, the entity receiving the award was treated as the immediate contracting party.

The archive consists of retrievable awarded procurement records. Coverage depends on what was disclosed and accessible. An earlier invitation without a matching award may contribute to the chronology, as in Fuzhou, but it contributes no additional observations to the award portfolio. The source register records the document role and retrieval address for each matched record.

In Fuzhou, the tender summary could be paired with a count of suppliers before and after technical conformity. Zhejiang provided item ranges and totals for all five evaluated bidders. Both were needed to apply the bound. Qinghai, Guangxi and Henan supplied full technical files, but their award notices gave only the winner’s score. Guangdong published each bidder’s actual scores for three broad blocks.

We recorded the depth of the technical file and the detail in the outcome record separately. A complete specification can end in a public notice that gives only the winner’s name or score. Conversely, a notice can give scores for all evaluated bidders while revealing little about what a tender required. We also recorded any conformity decision that could be traced to that round.

3.2 Coding Requirements and Evaluation Rules

Table 2 defines explicit, partial and unobserved evidence. A specific route to an alternative model, such as a configurable endpoint, qualifies as explicit. An interface needs an external connection rule or named compatibility specification. A generic integration application programming interface (API) is partial. The asset category requires reusable material, including a structured export, and the handover category requires a named deliverable or right tied to transfer of operating responsibility. Unspecified acceptance materials count as partial handover evidence. Unobserved means that the reviewed document did not supply qualifying information.

Table 2. Operational criteria for the four portability dimensions

Dimension	Affirmative Evidence	Boundary Example
Model substitutability (*M*)	Users can select among specified models or administrators can configure alternative endpoints	A list of models without a configurable or selectable route provides limited evidence
Interface interoperability (*I*)	An external compatibility specification or explicit third-party integration rule is named	A generic internal connection or unspecified API does not identify the external rule
Asset migration (*A*)	An identifiable reusable asset can be exported or transferred	A rendered document can differ from an executable workflow or structured graph
Contractual handover (*X*)	Named technical materials or access transfer to the buyer or its successor for continued operation	Routine delivery acceptance does not specify what a successor receives

We recorded the source, locator and coding rationale for each requirement and rechecked all 68 lot-by-dimension entries against the linked files (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Herderich et al., 2026; Ovádek et al., 2024). A stricter count required the tender to mention both import and export for migration. This shows how much the asset total depends on whether structured export alone qualifies.

At the conformity stage, the practical question is whether a bid can proceed. Among bids still under consideration, a scored item can add or deduct points. A composite demonstration may cover several capabilities under one score. For Fuzhou's attrition count, the starting field is the set of bidders who passed qualification. Totals alone tell us only about bidders who reached the scoring stage.

A reviewer needs a bidding-stage record that links the requirement to its treatment in scoring. For some Zhejiang items the rubric provides a deduction cap and no bidder-level item scores. When a portability feature sits inside a demonstration scored as a whole, we use the full demonstration range as a conservative cap. The resulting bound pertains to the deletion of the coded scoring items, including the whole composite item when applicable.

Clause locators are recorded in the source language. The clause register distinguishes ordinary delivery from an obligation to hand over resources for continued operation. A connection limited to components supplied by the same integrator was also distinguished from an external integration rule. Neither the award amount nor the supplier's ranking determines the technical code.

3.3 Score-Removal Bounds

Let T_w and T_q denote the published totals of the winner and of an evaluated competitor, c_{wj} and c_{qj} their contributions from criterion j, and b_j the width of the score interval that the rubric permits for that criterion.

A deduction criterion can be shifted by the same constant for all suppliers, so the contribution may be represented in the closed interval $[0, b_j]$ without changing score differences. If C is the set of criteria being removed, the remaining score difference satisfies:

$$T_w - T_q - \sum_{j \in C} b_j \le (T_w - T_q) - \sum_{j \in C} (c_{wj} - c_{qj}) \le T_w - T_q + \sum_{j \in C} b_j \tag{1}$$

For a field of evaluated bids, subtract the sum of the item ranges from the smallest observed winning lead. A positive result establishes that the winner stays ahead after those items are removed. A bound at or below zero is inconclusive from the published totals and ranges. In that case the office can look for the actual item scores or tighter restrictions on their differences. The calculation applies to additive scoring with the bidder set and retained scores fixed. Rescaling the remaining scores or changing qualification rules requires a different analysis.

In Zhejiang, three screenshot-backed provisions allowed deductions of up to 0.80 points each. The fourth item was worth up to 2.00 points and covered interface compatibility, debugging and multi-turn interaction. We used the five published totals to bound deletions of the model-access pair, the interface pair and all four items. We checked the endpoints for the original first- and second-ranked bidders and repeated the calculation on non-price subtotals. Guangdong called for a different calculation. Its published scores allowed us to subtract one whole block from each total and rank the bids on the scores that remained.

The source register, clause locators, score inputs and scripts are included with the research materials. Supplementary Appendix A sets out the award-portfolio methods and results.

4. Results

4.1 Which Controls the Tender Files Specify

Which safeguards we could identify depended on the file. Each of the three full specifications explicitly addressed alternative models and reusable assets. Two also gave external interface rules. The detailed notices added two model-access cases, bringing the observed total to five. None of the 12 summary notices supported an explicit code in any dimension. All three application-led lots with multiple bidder scores were in that summary group (Table 3 and Figure 1).

Table 3. Technical documentation and disclosed evaluation

Technical Document Reviewed	Application-Led Lots	Lots With Multiple Bidder Scores	Lots With Conformity Information
Full technical tender	3	0	0
Detailed notice	2	0	1
Summary notice	12	3	3
Total	17	3	4




Figure 1. Evidence status by portability dimension in the 17 application-led lots

One detail in Henan's Lot 2 stood out. The rubric assigned a 0.30-point deduction for each ordinary technical deviation. That rule could be traced to requirements covering four kinds of model, REST-style interfaces for plugins and workflow import and export for migration or backup. The published award gave the winner's score of 85.14. From that total we could locate the evaluation outcome, while the deductions actually applied and the other bidders' scores remained undisclosed. Figure 2 shows where those pieces of evidence overlap across lots.

Guangxi asked for a knowledge-graph export in an Excel template. Henan and Qinghai asked bidders to provide a way to import and export workflow definitions for migration or backup. Counting only requirements of the latter kind reduced the number of explicit asset cases from three to two. That distinction affects what a university can request at handover. Possession of an exported object gives the buyer a starting point. Restoring a working application also requires the receiving environment and its dependencies.

Yunnan Open University's notice let us code model switching with confidence. It also mentioned an application API and internal workflow authoring. There was no external compatibility rule and no provision describing how to take a reusable asset out of the platform. We coded the latter two dimensions as partial. The University of International Business and Economics likewise requested an API for secondary integration while leaving the compatibility rule unspecified. For handover, Tianjin's reference to delivery of acceptance materials was the sole partial code. No reviewed file supported an explicit handover code.

In the file column, F identifies a full tender file, D a detailed notice and S a summary notice. E and P indicate explicit and partial portability evidence, respectively. A dash marks unobserved evidence. The result codes B, W and A identify multiple bidder scores, a winner score and an award-only record, respectively. The supplementary display key links each row to its source records.




Figure 2. Technical source depth, portability evidence and award disclosure by application-led lot

Table 4 traces five tender requirements into their published evaluation routes. Guangxi offered one point for showing that the teaching assistant could switch among at least ten models. It specified graph export elsewhere. Qinghai included workflow management in the platform-service proposal. Henan stated a deduction for a deviation on the workflow import and export requirement. From those files, an evaluator can recover where the feature enters the assessment and what the bidder was expected to show.

Table 4. Portability requirements and evaluation routes in five higher education procurements

Case	Capability or Assessed Requirement	Published Evaluation Route	Observed Outcome Evidence
Fuzhou Vocational College	Demonstration of required functions, with configurable model access described in the tender	Technical conformity gate	Six qualified, two excluded for incomplete demonstration compliance
Guangxi Agricultural Vocational College	Model switching and structured knowledge-graph export	One model-switching point and a broader export requirement	Award and rubric available
Qinghai University	Manual model selection and workflow migration	Platform-services proposal containing workflow management	Award and rubric available
Henan University of Chinese Medicine	Alternative model access, REST-style plugins and workflow import and export	Ordinary deviations incur a 0.30-point deduction per item within the technical block	Award and rubric available
Zhejiang University of Technology	Alternative model access and compatible external interface	Three screenshot-supported criteria and one composite demonstration	Five bidder totals and price and non-price subtotals

Note: REST = representational state transfer.

4.2 Fuzhou Technical Conformity Before Ranking

The field narrowed before ranking. All six bidders passed qualification in Fuzhou's third round, then two failed technical conformity after the overall demonstration (Figure 3). This was the third invitation for the teaching system. The second and third invitations used the same wording on configuring model endpoints and credentials. The outcome notice attributes the two exclusions to the overall demonstration. The particular function, or combination of functions, that each bidder failed to show is unknown.

The award was CNY 981,800 for seven software items or customizations. Several brands appeared under the same award. The college therefore had one immediate contracting party for the package. If a component supplied elsewhere fails, it is the contract with that party that can specify who is responsible for fixing it.




Figure 3. Bidder counts at qualification and technical conformity in Fuzhou's third tender round

4.3 Zhejiang and the Stability of the Award Ranking

The overall scores in Zhejiang were 97.20 for the winner and 91.71 for the runner-up, a lead of 5.49 points (Table 5). We also looked at the non-price result. There the same two bidders were separated by 4.50 points, with scores of 67.20 and 62.70. For each of the five bidders, the mean of the five judges' scores reproduced the published non-price subtotal.

Table 5. Published price and non-price scores in the Zhejiang case

Supplier Rank	Non-Price Points	Price Points	Total
1	67.20	30.00	97.20
2	62.70	29.01	91.71
3	46.60	29.10	75.70
4	43.00	28.96	71.96
5	40.90	28.95	69.85

The four items together had a range of 4.40 points. Deleting the model-access pair left a lower bound of 3.89 points, and deleting the interface pair left 2.69. Removing all four gave the winner a minimum lead of 1.09 points over the runner-up (Figure 4). The other three lower bounds ranged from 17.10 to 22.95 points. Against the runner-up, the total-score interval was 1.09 to 9.89 points.




Figure 4. Zhejiang's published winning margin and lower bounds after removing identified scoring items

The non-price comparison was closer. Its lower bound was just 0.10 points. The gap stayed positive even there, under the fixed-score assumptions. The item scores themselves remain unknown, so the bounds tell us how far the margins could move after deletion.

The 2.00-point demonstration covered interface compatibility, debugging and multi-turn interaction. The rubric gives those functions a joint score. We therefore allowed the entire 2.00-point range to vary in the deletion calculation. The result remains a conservative test of the group of scoring items.

4.4 What the Disclosed Score Records Support

Table 6 groups tenders by the records available for review. Zhejiang supplies point ranges and totals for the evaluated field. Guangdong publishes the exact scores for broader blocks. Hunan and Tianjin disclose totals without the item ranges needed to isolate a portability requirement. Those totals describe the observed bids within each tender.

Table 6. Procurement cases grouped by the evidence available for score review

Evidence Class	Procurement	Scored Bids	Records Available	Analysis Supported
Item ranges and totals	Zhejiang University of Technology	5	Matched rubric and bidder totals	Bound for deleting identified items
Actual block scores	Guangdong agent platform	3	Technical, business and price scores by bidder	Exact recalculation after deleting a block
Totals only	Hunan Normal University	4	Bidder totals disclosed	Describe the observed ranking
Totals only	Tianjin Vocational Institute	3	Bidder totals disclosed	Describe the observed ranking

Guangxi gives the converse case. Its rubric identifies a one-point model-switching item, but the award notice gives only the winner's 93.40 points. We can see how the criterion entered scoring. Without another bidder's total, there is no observed margin to test.

4.5 Guangdong and Deletion of a Whole Scoring Block

Removing Guangdong's technical block would put the published runner-up first. Its retained score was 35.00, against 26.38 for the original winner, a lead of 8.62 points. The original winner remained first when we removed the business or price block separately (Figure 5). Each check subtracts the actual scores for the entire block from the published totals. The technical block covers several capabilities, so these results describe the influence of that block as a whole.




Figure 5. Guangdong bidder totals after deletion of one published score block

5. Discussion

5.1 Where Control Sits in the Supplier Relationship

Fuzhou's request for configurable model access and Henan's request for workflow import and export concern work that different staff may need to do. The application administrator needs permission to connect a model. A team taking over a workflow also needs the definition and the means to reconnect its dependencies. The tender can leave routine operation to an integrator while identifying the actions the institution expects to perform at handover.

Guangxi specified a spreadsheet export of a knowledge graph. At acceptance, a buyer could inspect the exported data. Henan specified workflow import and export for migration or backup. For a workflow that must run elsewhere, the more revealing test is to have a named user import and execute it in a receiving environment.

Specifying who can verify the result gives the buyer a way to follow up on the promise (Brown et al., 2006; Huber et al., 2025).

We would keep handover as a separate dimension because it records an obligation that asset portability alone cannot establish. A workflow may be exportable even when the outgoing supplier controls its credentials or holds the only instructions for running it. A handover clause can assign who must release those resources, to whom and when. A demonstration with several models supplies evidence about flexibility during operation (Langer & Haag, 2026). The question at exit is who must make that flexibility available to the successor.

The handover record was sparse even in the full technical files. None of the three supplied an explicit handover clause under our rule. The only partial code came from a summary notice for Tianjin, which mentioned acceptance materials and left their contents and access terms unspecified. The split makes it hard to tell whether buyers rarely specify these obligations or whether the obligations sit in documents outside the archive. To distinguish those possibilities, a follow-up would need to match the tender to the signed contract and any schedules, then check acceptance or exit records for evidence of an actual transfer.

5.2 How to Review a Disputed Scoring Item

What is the office being asked to decide? A conformity challenge calls for the demonstration requirement and the evaluators' grounds for exclusion. Fuzhou gives the count at the gate, but the record leaves the specific failure in each excluded bid unidentified. A challenge to a scored item calls for the scoring schedule and the bidder totals from the same lot and round.

We would use a positive lower bound to resolve a narrow ranking question. Could deletion of the specified points displace the observed winner when bids and other scores are fixed? In Zhejiang the answer was clear. The remaining lead was at least 1.09 points. If the lower bound is zero or negative, the office needs the actual scores or tighter limits on their differences to settle the ranking question. Where the relevant scores are published, as they were for Guangdong's blocks, the office can recalculate the retained totals directly.

The review may need to continue. Evaluators may have applied a requirement inconsistently, or the supplier may still owe a safeguard that matters for acceptance and handover. The ranking bound can help prioritize requests for detailed records when the only question is who would have won. It offers no test of whether a scored safeguard was applied correctly or can be delivered. Table 7 records that distinction.

Table 7. Evidence and decisions in a procurement score review

Review Stage	Record to Retain	Check	What Follows
Verify the match	Lot, round, rubric and outcome notice	Match the rules and totals to the same procurement	Record unavailable documents
Identify the rule	Conformity test or separately scored item	Check what happened before ranking	Review exclusions against the test record
Set the score range	Item minima and maxima or actual scores	Use the full documented range for an unseparated composite	Document scope and basis for each range
Apply the bound	Smallest winning lead and sum of item ranges	Positive lower bound preserves first rank under deletion	Seek detailed scores if the bound is zero or negative. Check compliance separately.
Check exact scores	The relevant item or block score for each tenderer	Subtract those scores and rank the retained totals	Record the revised standing for the same bidder set

The Guangdong reversal shows why the level of the question matters. It indicates that the technical block as scored was decisive in that deletion exercise. Which criterion drove the result remains open. An item-level bound can answer a narrower challenge when the file supplies the needed ranges. If recovering a workflow is essential to future operations, the buyer can make it an acceptance or eligibility requirement and reserve points for differences in how readily authorized users can complete the transfer.

5.3 From Evaluation to Contract Management

Begin the acceptance plan with the task the buyer expects to perform. For model substitution, name the administrator and ask that person to configure another endpoint and run an existing application with the same request format. For workflow transfer, name the artifact, document its dependencies and specify where it should be imported. The contract can then assign who delivers the export, supporting documentation and access when responsibility changes.

The published assessment should leave enough detail for the next contract manager to reconstruct the decision. At minimum, link the relevant lot and round to the requirement, the stage of assessment and the outcome. If a composite demonstration fails, recording the step that failed preserves information the overall pass or fail result

cannot convey. Assign responsibility separately where the institution, integrator and model provider all have work to do.

A review of commitments by first-tier supplier can help an institution decide which awards merit particular attention at renewal. Appendix A illustrates the difference between concentration from a large mixed package and concentration from repeated awards to the same group. Contract values are an indicator of financial exposure. They do not describe how readily a workflow can be moved or who controls a particular interface.

5.4 Transferability and Limits of Inference

The five model-access codes document five instances in which buyers expressly addressed substitution. Three came from full files and two from detailed notices. The two interface codes and three asset codes all came from full files. That clustering is a finding about the available evidence. It gives us no basis for estimating how frequently the underlying safeguards were used across universities. Even the three full files were paired with notices giving only the winner's score. More detailed specifications help us see what buyers asked for, but an item-level ranking analysis also needs records on their competitors.

For another outsourcing setting, we would begin with a task the buyer or its successor needs to perform. The object to be transferred, the responsible party and the test for completion then define the coding rule.

In enterprise IT outsourcing, take the example of a buyer needing to redeploy a data pipeline. A source-code archive can qualify as reusable asset evidence if the contract specifies what it contains. An explicit interface code would require a defined connection, such as a documented API contract or message schema. To code handover, look for a commitment naming who provides the configuration, access and deployment instructions to the receiving team. A test in which that team actually runs the pipeline would provide stronger evidence of usable control.

In conventional logistics outsourcing, model substitution would normally be inapplicable. An interface code could instead require a specified format for exchanging order or tracking events with the incoming carrier. An asset code could require a reusable export of open orders and shipment history. Handover would call for a named party to assign custody of in-transit shipments and provide the incoming carrier with the records and access it needs. These examples illustrate how to adapt the coding rules. In an extension of the protocol, record an inapplicable capability separately from an applicable capability for which the available file gives no evidence.

These checks depend on access to the relevant requirements and decisions. An internal score sheet can serve the same purpose as a published score notice if it identifies the evaluated bids and the point ranges. Where a supplier is selected through negotiation or a holistic judgment, the clause and handover checks can still be performed. The score bound requires additive scoring and a fixed evaluated field. A signed clause records an obligation, an acceptance test checks a capability and an exit record can show whether the transfer took place.

6. Conclusions

The tender files show how universities specified which tasks the integrator would perform and which capabilities the buyer wanted to retain. In Fuzhou, two of six qualified suppliers failed the overall conformity demonstration. In Zhejiang, the winner remained at least 1.09 points ahead after deletion of four scoring items under fixed bidder and scoring conditions.

The practical decision comes down to what the buyer needs to settle. For eligibility, preserve the test and the grounds for exclusion. For ranking, retain the relevant point ranges and bidder totals or the exact scores. For future handover, name the person who needs to act, the artifact or access that must be provided and the test that demonstrates it can be used. The evidence for each decision belongs in the contract file.

Data Availability

The research package includes the search log, source and award registers, clause records, score inputs and reproduction scripts. Supplementary Appendix A reports the award-portfolio analysis.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Supplementary Material

The supplement contains the technical document matrix, the 68-cell source recheck, the asset-definition sensitivity results, and the full Guangdong and Zhejiang score calculations.